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I. INTRODUCTION
Cases for this year's Survey of Florida Evidence demonstrate some of
the same similarities as in previous years. Criminal evidentiary cases
outnumbered civil evidentiary cases, and relevancy and hearsay issues were
the most prolific topics. During the survey period, the Supreme Court of
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Florida resolved some outstanding conflicts between the district courts of
appeal on issues regarding expert testimony and hearsay; however, with the
exception of these cases there were only a few noteworthy cases. The
legislature added in a new evidentiary privilege and a new hearsay exception
this year and made the language of the evidence code gender-neutral.
II. RULINGS ON EVIDENCE
Section 90.104' of the Florida Evidence Code requires a timely
objection in order to preserve a point for appeal.2 Objections which are not
timely made are waived. The appellate courts are unable to consider an
assertion of error in the admission of evidence, made in the trial court, if
counsel fails to make a contemporaneous objection at trial.4 Only if the
error is fundamental will an appellate court consider the issue on appeal.'
The Supreme Court of Florida has indicated that fundamental error will be
found infrequently.6 However, as the following case indicates, the appellate
courts of Florida occasionally turn this simple rule on its head in a pell-mell
effort to correct what they perceive to be an injustice from the reading of a
cold record.
In a case that arose from a certified question regarding the child
hearsay exception of section 90.803(23) 7 of the Florida Statutes, the
Supreme Court of Florida followed the old adage that "'hard cases make bad
law.' ' '8 In Anderson v. State,9 the defendant was charged with lewd and
lascivious assault upon a child. 0 Prior to trial the State gave notice that
it intended to introduce testimony at trial that the child victim told two
1. FLA. STAT.

§ 90.104 (Supp. 1994).

2. See Holley v. State, 523 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
3. See Roundtree v. State, 350 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 362
So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1978).
4. A proper objection has two ingredients, both of which are needed to preserve
objections for appellate review. First, the objection must be timely. If counsel does not
promptly object the problem is waived. Second, the objection must be specific. See, e.g.,
Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 407 (1989). Failure
to state the correct grounds for objection will waive it. The appellate courts have strictly
monitored this rule.
5. FLA. STAT. § 90.104(3) (Supp. 1994).
6. Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970) (citations omitted) ("The appellate
court should exercise its discretion under the doctrine of fundamental error very guardedly.");
see also CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE, § 104.6 (5th ed. 1994).
7. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1991).
8. Anderson v. State, 655 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 1995).
9. Id. at 1118.
10. Id. at 1119.
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adults that the defendant touched her with his penis." There was no other
corroborating eyewitness or physical evidence tying the defendant to the
crime. The State contended that the testimony fell within the exception to
the hearsay rule for statements made by child victims set forth in section
90.803(23).12
At trial the hearsay was entered and there was no objection by the
defendant, nor was there a hearing held as was contemplated by section
90.803(23)."3 Additionally, the trial court ruled that the child was not
competent to testify as the child could not give consistent answers regarding
whether she knew what it meant to tell the truth.14 The defendant's motion
for judgment of acquittal was denied and the jury returned a guilty
verdict. 5
On appeal to the district court the defendant argued that his conviction
was based solely upon hearsay that was never determined to be reliable nor
corroborated. 6 The district court affirmed the conviction finding that there
was no objection at trial to the testimony.17 The Supreme Court of Florida
reversed the district court of appeal, despite finding that: 1) where there are
no objections made to hearsay the evidence is admitted and the issue is
barred from appellate review;" 2) the trial court's failure to make sufficient
findings under section 90.803(23) of the FloridaStatutes is not fundamental
error; 9 3) and finally, and most disturbing, had an objection been made,
the Supreme Court of Florida indicated that the statement might have been

11. Id,
12. Anderson, 655 So. 2d at 1119.
13. I The competency of the defending trial attorney must surely be questioned given
the facts of the case. The evidence code specifically requires a hearing before the hearsay
statement can be utilized in court. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23)(a)(1) (1991). To ask what type
of trial strategy was being used when crucial damning testimony is let in without the required
hearing or even an objection boggles the imagination. However, poor lawyering is fostered
when the appellate courts bail out an incompetent attorney, instead of having the conviction
collaterally attacked for ineffective assistance of counsel under Rule 3.850. See FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.850. Based on the facts reported in the opinion the issues were not preserved for
appeal and should not have been reversed by the Supreme Court. The proper procedure was
a collateral attack of the conviction for ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
14. Anderson, 655 So. 2d at 1119.
15. Id
16. Id.

17. Id
18. See Wyatt v. State, 641 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1983
(1995).
19. See State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994).
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admissible as an excited utterance. 0 The supreme court spent much of the
opinion stating that their holding "should be specifically limited to the facts
of this case.",2' As well it should, since section 90.104 of the Florida
Statutes requires a specific and timely objection.2 2 It seems that the
supreme court is already forgetting their prior rulings, in a host of other
cases, that have come down hard on predicating a reversal when a
23
contemporaneous objection is lacking and the error is not fundamental.
The only guidance this case offers is the extent that the appellate courts will
sometimes go to prevent a perceived injustice.
The better procedure would have been to uphold the conviction, since
the issue was not preserved. The conviction could then be collaterally
attacked under Rule 3.85024 for ineffective assistance of counsel. Only in
this way will the courts of Florida foster proper lawyering while preserving
the rights of the accused. Throwing in a "hard case makes bad law"
decision, that is directly contrary to dozens of other decisions, offers neither
guidance nor enlightenment for those attorneys who diligently read the
appellate opinions for direction to competently try their cases and uphold the
rights of their clients.
IlI. INTRODUCTION OF RELATED WRITINGS OR RECORDED
STATEMENTS
Section 90.10825 of the Florida Evidence Code allows a party to
contemporaneously introduce a writing or recorded statement after a similar
writing or recorded statement has been introduced by the opposing party.
When a writing or recorded statement is introduced at trial, a misleading
impression may be created by taking the matters contained in it out of
context. Therefore, section 90.108 allows the adverse party to require the
20. An excited utterance under § 90.803 of the Florida Statutes is a firmly rooted
hearsay exception, whose reliability and trustworthiness is grounded in the fact that "[a]
person who is excited as a result of a startling event does not have the reflective capacity
which is essential for conscious misrepresentation; therefore statements that are made by the
person who is in a state of excitement are spontaneous and have sufficient guarantees of
truthfulness." EHRHARDT, supra note 6, § 803.2.
21. Anderson, 655 So. 2d at 1119.
22. See Dale A. Bruschi, Evidence: 1992 Survey of FloridaLaw, 17 NOVA L. REV.
255, 257 (1992).
23. See Rodriguez v. State, 609 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1992); Glendening v. State, 536 So.
2d 212 (Fla. 1988); Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1978); Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So.
2d 134 (Fla. 1970); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Shouse, 91 So. 90 (Fla. 1922).
24. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850.
25. FLA. STAT. § 90.108 (1993).
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remainder of the writing or document to be introduced if fairness requires
that it be considered contemporaneously with the original writing or
document. This principle is often called the "rule of completeness."
Section 90.108 has been greatly expanded by the decisional case law
over the years. 26 The strict interpretation of section 90.108 only allows
introduction of the related writing or document at the time the original
writings or documents are offered into evidence. The provision may not be
utilized during cross-examination or during the party's own case.27
However, the decisional case law has expanded this section by allowing not
only written statements, documents, and "recorded statements ' 28 but it also
has been applied to testimony regarding part of a conversation. 29 Additionally, some decisions have applied section 90.108 to questions asked during
cross-examination, rather than requiring that the additional evidence be
admitted at the time the witness testifies on direct examination.30
A good example of the expansion of section 90.108 is seen in Johnson
v. State.3 1 In Johnson, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter. When
the defendant was arrested he told the police officer that he had been in a
fight with the victim over a broken watch and that he hit the victim with a
stick.32 Later at the police station the defendant gave a formal statement

26. See Long v. State, 610 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1992); Morrison v. State, 546 So. 2d 102
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
27. In other words, opposing counsel cannot wait until his cross-examination of the
witness or until his case-in-chief to enter the related writings or documents under this section.
In civil trials the use of § 90.108 is often confused with the use of Rule 1.330(a)(4) and
1.340(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. These rules state that when portions of
depositions and interrogatories are not offered by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction of any other part that in fairness ought to be considered with the part introduced.
Section 90.108 extends the right beyond depositions and interrogatories to any writing or
recorded statement offered as evidence during the course of a trial.
There is another difference between § 90.108 and rule 1.330(a)(4). Rule 1.330(a)(4)
provides that any other party may introduce any other parts of the deposition. Unlike §
90.108, rule 1.330(a)(4) does not require that the portion of the deposition explain or clarify
the portions originally offered.
28. A statement which is recorded by a court reporter or by a tape-recording is a
"recorded statement' and is subject to § 90.108.
29. See Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1982).
30. See Johnson v. State, 653 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Somerville v.
State, 584 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
31. 653 So. 3d at 1074.
32. Id. at 1075.
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asserting that he hit the victim33only after the victim threatened him and only
after the victim hit him first.
During trial the State introduced the defendant's first statement. The
trial court refused to allow the defense to cross examine the officer
concerning the second statement.34 The defendant was convicted at trial
and the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the conviction. The district
court cited section 90.108 as a basis for its finding that the State opened the
door by eliciting testimony as to part of the conversation.35 Therefore, the
defendant was entitled to cross-examine the witness about other relevant
statements made during the conversation.
The district court reasoned that the "rule is not limited to segments of
one conversation, but also allows admission of 'other related conversations
that in fairness are necessary for the jury to accurately perceive the whole
context of what has transpired between the two.' ' 3 6 The defendant should
have been allowed to cross-examine the officer regarding the second
statement, since the second statement qualified or explained the first
statement. By itself the first statement standing alone left the jury with an
allegedly incomplete picture of the defendant's behavior.
IV. IMPEACHMENT

In Peterson v. State,37 the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
a witness may be asked about prior convictions if the attorney has a good
faith basis for asking the questions even though the certified copies of
conviction are not in hand. Though this area of the evidence code would
seem to be well-settled in Florida, it is actually far from that.
In Peterson, the defendant testified at trial regarding his claim that he
acted in self defense when he stabbed the victim.3" By taking the stand the
defendant placed his credibility in issue and was thus open to impeachment
regarding his prior convictions. After the State closed its case, the
defendant moved in limine to exclude any questioning regarding the
defendant's prior convictions when the defendant testified. Defense counsel
acknowledged that the prosecution had supplied him with copies of reports

33. Id.
34. Id. Generally, the defendant's self-serving exculpatory statement is inadmissible.
It is hearsay that does not fall within an exception.
35. Id.
36. Johnson, 653 So. 2d at 1075 (citations omitted).
37. 645 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 659 So. 2d 272 (Fla.
1995).
38. Id. at 11.
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from the State of New York regarding the defendant's criminal record. In
39
addition, the prosecution had supplied the defense with an N.C.I.C.
printout of the defendant's convictions. The defense contended that the
prosecution could not inquire into the defendant's criminal record since
these "rap sheets" were not certified copies of conviction.'
During a hearing regarding the use of the impeachment material, the
trial court reviewed the rap sheets with counsel. The prosecutor stated that
he had a good faith belief that the defendant had at least three felony
convictions. The trial court agreed to allow the prosecutor to ask the
standard two questions: 1) Have you ever been convicted of a felony?; and
2) How many times?" The defense on redirect examination asked the
defendant how long ago the convictions were. The defendant stated they
were twenty years ago.42 The district court found that the procedures
utilized by the trial court were sufficient to allow the impeachment without
having the certified copies of conviction in hand.43
On appeal, the defendant cited Cummings v. State,44 for the "rule"
prohibiting questions regarding prior convictions unless the prosecutor has
certified copies of conviction in hand to introduce as impeachment. The
district court noted that this was neither the Cummings court's "holding in
the case nor an absolute proscription requiring reversal in every case where
the suggested procedure is not followed. 45 The district court correctly
posited that Cummings only addressed the proper form of the questions to
be asked on impeachment under the newly enacted Florida Evidence
Code.46 The Cummings court did not develop a blanket rule of law that
certified copies of conviction must be in hand to allow impeachment.
39. This is an acronym for "National Crime Index Computer" printout. The printout is
for law enforcement eyes only and it is improper to give this type of printout to anyone
outside of law enforcement.
40. Peterson, 645 So. 2d at 11. The defense did not challenge the accuracy of the "rap
sheets" since the defense did not think that the State could inquire into his client's criminal
records without certified copies of conviction.
41. Ia During the actual cross examination the prosecutor asked the standard questions
but when the defendant stated that he had one less felony than the rap sheets indicated the
prosecutor followed up his questioning by asking if the defendant had "ever been convicted
of a misdemeanor involving dishonesty" to which the defendant answered "yes." This was
the proper question to ask under the FloridaEvidence Code. See EHRHARDT, supra note 6,
§ 610.6.
42. Peterson, 645 So. 2d at 11.
43. Ia at 11-12.
44. 412 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
45. Peterson, 645 So. 2d at 12.
46. Ia
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The district court realized that had the defendant in Peterson denied his
prior convictions, the only way the prosecution could impeach him was by
entering certified copies of his prior convictions in their rebuttal case. The
"rap sheets" would not have been admissible for such a purpose and further
questioning on the subject would not be allowed.47 Without the certified
copies of conviction the prosecution would have been stuck with the
defendant's denial of his prior convictions.4"
Florida evidence writers have generally acknowledged that before the
prosecution can ask about prior convictions, the prosecution must have
certified copies of conviction in hand. No per se "good faith" exception has
technically existed. The reasoning is simple: if the prosecution asks the
defendant if he's ever been convicted of a felony, and the defendant denies
the question,49 the jury could be left with the indelible impression that the
defendant has prior criminal convictions. This could mislead the jury if the
defendant was, in fact, charged but never convicted or was merely arrested
but never convicted. Without the ability to prove up the prior convictions,
the state has the immutable advantage of misleading the jury regarding the
defendant's prior criminal record. Therefore, "good faith" has never
technically existed.50
However, in the situation that existed in Peterson the trial court had a
very strong argument for allowing the impeachment questions to be asked.
Both of the State's "rap sheets" indicated convictions and defense counsel's
argument to the trial court indicated that his client had been previously
convicted of felonies. Since a trial is a search for the truth, the defendant
has no constitutional right to lie under oath." The defense attorney's

47. See Irvin v. State, 324 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 334 So. 2d
608 (Fla. 1976).
48. Of course the defendant's statement denying his prior convictions could later be used
against the defendant in a perjury charge if the defendant, in fact, lied under oath during trial.
49. Or, likewise if the defendant denies the number of convictions.
50. But see Alvarez v. State, 467 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 476
So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1985), where the Third District Court of Appeal attempted to establish a
"good faith" exception.
51. Peterson, 645 So. 2d at 11. Defense counsel stated that at least one of the
defendant's three prior felony convictions was not true and the defendant would deny that
one. Id. This indicated that the defendant did, in fact, have two valid felony convictions that
he would not deny. Id.
52. When the prosecution does not have certified copies of conviction, but has some
indication that the defendant/witness may have prior convictions, the proper procedure should
be for the defendant to be questioned under oath, outside the presence of the jury. Since the
defendant/witness does not have a constitutional right to lie under oath, the prosecution has
some indication of prior felony convictions (or misdemeanors involving dishonesty or false
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argument to the court impliedly acknowledged that the defendant had prior
convictions, and the prosecution had a strong good faith belief of the
defendant's prior convictions through two "rap sheets." Therefore the
impeachment was properly allowed. 53 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal's withdrawal from an inflexible rule of impeachment to a more
flexible rule will not violate a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial
and will insure that a trial will still be a search for the truth.54

statement) because a trial is a search for the truth and the credibility of the defendant/witness
is often a crucial point of the trial, this procedure should be utilized.
If the defendant/witness admits the prior convictions outside of the presence of the jury,
then the questions should be allowed to be asked in the presence of the jury. If the
defendant/witness then denies the prior convictions in front of the jury, the prosecution can
prove up the prior statements by calling the court reporter to testify to the defendant/witness'
prior statements regarding his prior convictions. The defendant/witness could also be charged
with perjury. See Alvarez, 467 So. 2d at 455. Alvarez was later disapproved by the Supreme
Court of Florida in Riechmann v. State, 581 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
405 (1992), but only to the extent that it allowed the trial court to determine that a conviction
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law of this country
and not the country were the conviction occurred. The proper procedure is to establish that
the law was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law of the
foreign country where the defendant was convicted, before it can be used for impeachment.
53. Peterson, 545 So. 2d at 13. The Fourth District Court of Appeal noted a conflict
with Peoples v. State, 576 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991), affjd on other grounds,
612 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1992). The Peoples case followed Cummings in excluding impeachment
evidence when the certified copies of conviction are not in hand. But as noted, supra note
45, the Fourth District Court of Appeal recognized that Cummings did not reach such a
holding. Therefore, the Fifth District Court of Appeal's reliance on Cummings for this
proposition is inaccurate.
54. The procedure outlined in note 51, supra,is the proper and correct way to proceed
when there are no certified copies of conviction in hand, but there is a "good faith" belief
that the defendant/witness has convictions. The "good faith" belief will foster judicial
economy, since precious judicial resources will not be spent sending the jury out if there is
no basis for the prosecution to even ask the question. This procedure will guard against the
prosecution asking about criminal convictions when it cannot prove them up, and therefore,
leave an improper impression on the jury. If the prosecution gets a denial to the questions
and does not have certified copies of conviction, it will not be allowed to repeat the questions
before the jury.
This procedure will safeguard the integrity of the trial court as a search for the truth,
since an acknowledgment of the prior convictions should be allowed to be repeated in the
presence of the jury even though certified copies of conviction are not in hand. The jury will
then be able to properly evaluate the defendant/witness' testimony. However, an improper
denial by the defendant/witness will not allow the individual to subvert the system to his own
end, since such a denial could subject him to a prosecution for perjury even if the individual
is successful in the original trial. No individual has the constitutional right to subvert justice
and the search for the truth by being fortunate enough to have his convictions in a distant
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V. EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY
Scientific Evidence

During the survey period the Supreme Court of Florida delved into the
area of expert testimony on scientific evidence under section 90.702 of the
Florida Evidence Code." Ramirez v. State56 is of value because the
supreme court discusses the procedure to use when utilizing novel scientific
principles under the Frye standard.57 In Ramirez, testimony revealed that
the murder victim was stabbed twelve times. The State introduced into
evidence a knife linked to the defendant. During trial the expert gave an
opinion that the defendant's knife was the only knife that could have been
used in the murder. 8
Prior to trial, the State requested a special hearing to present testimony
and evidence to the trial judge relating to the reliability of knifemark
comparison evidence.5 9 The hearing was held and the State presented
evidence regarding the theory, practice, and procedures involved in
knifemark comparisons.60 After the State's presentation at the pretrial
hearing, the defense offered an expert to testify, against the scientific
reliability of knife mark comparisons. 6' The trial judge refused to allow
the defense expert to testify, stating that such testimony was for the jury and
not relevant to the issue of basic admissibility. 2
The supreme court analyzed the factors needed when expert testimony
concerns a new or novel principle:
The admission into evidence of expert opinion testimony concerning a
new or novel scientific principle is a four-step process. First, the trial

jurisdiction that has a poor or slow record keeping system.
55. FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (Supp. 1994).
56. 651 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1995).
57. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
58. Ramirez, 651 So. 2d at 1166. The State could have avoided this second appeal and
reversal, by simply following the supreme court's advice in the first appeal and reversal to
present testimony that the wounds on the victim were consistent with the defendant's knife.
Id. However, the State decided that it would be wiser to prove that this was the only knife
that could have been used in the murder. They will now, of course, get to try this case for
a third time.
59. Id. This was done in response to the supreme court's request after this case was
reversed in the first trial. See Ramirez v. State, 542 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1989), appeal after
remand, 651 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1995).
60. Ramirez, 651 So. 2d at 1166.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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judge must determine whether such expert's testimony will assist the
jury in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue.
Second, the trial judge must decide whether the experts testimony is
based on a scientific principle or discovery that is "sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs." This standard, commonly referred to as the "Frye
test," was expressly adopted by this court in Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d
9, 18 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 894 (1986) and Stokes v. State,

548 So. 2d 188, 195 (Fla. 1989). The third step in the process is for
the trial judge to determine whether a particular witness is qualified as
an expert to present opinion testimony on the subject in issue. § 90.702,
Fla. Stat. (1993). All three of these initial steps are decisions to be
made by the trial judge alone. Fourth, the judge may then allow the
expert to render an opinion on the subject of his or her expertise, and
it is then up to the jury to determine the credibility of the expert's
63
opinion, which it may either accept or reject.
The supreme court found the second inquiry to be especially important
to the process.64 Basically, when a novel type of scientific opinion is
offered, the party offering the evidence must demonstrate the requirements
of scientific acceptance and reliability in the particular field in which it
belongs.6 5 The burden is on the proponent of the evidence to prove the
general acceptance of the underlying scientific principle, and the testing
procedures used to apply that principle to the facts of the case. The trial
judge will determine this question. The issue of general acceptance under
the Frye test is established by a preponderance of the evidence.
A hearing on the admissibility of novel scientific evidence is adversarial. Both sides may present conflicting evidence to the trial judge as
the trier of fact. The testimony of both parties is needed, otherwise the trial
judge is denied a full presentation of the relevant evidence. The supreme
court found that it was impossible to determine whether the evidence
presented by the State was sufficient to prove the reliability of knifemark
comparisons because the defendant was denied the right to present any
evidence to the contrary at the pretrial hearing. 66 Therefore, the case was
reversed and remanded. 67

63. Id. at 1166-67 (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 1167.
65. See, EHRHARDT, supra note 6, § 702 at 500; MICHAEL H.
FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 702, at 517 (ed. 1987).
66. Ramirez, 651 So. 2d at 1168.
67. Id
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In a somewhat related case the Second District Court of Appeal dealt
with the Frye standard from the standpoint of DNA statistical analysis. In
Brim v. State, 8 the issue presented to the district court was whether,
in considering a request for admission of the statistical consequences of
the analysis of matching DNA samples, a court must exclude all or part
of that analysis if the court is presented with evidence of two differing
but generally accepted views within the scientific community concerning
the proper population frequency statistics to be applied.69
The statistical analysis is critical to DNA testing for the extremely persuasive probability estimates (one in a billion) that are associated with the
testing.
In analyzing the statistical probabilities in Brim, two divergent views
emerged. First, the statistical probabilities would change depending on
which sample populations database was utilized.7" This essentially means
that use of one database would demonstrate that one in one billion had the
same genetic DNA code as the defendant, while utilization of another
population database would yield a figure of one in nine thousand. 7'
In Brim, both statistical theories were presented. It was argued that both
theories are generally accepted in the scientific community.7 2 The concern
is whether a disagreement regarding the deductions of a scientific theory
makes the theory itself inadmissible in evidence. The Brim court, citing to
the Ramirez decision, found that where there are two differing, but two
generally accepted deductions that can be made from generally accepted
scientific evidence, they may both be admitted, provided that the underlying
scientific evidence satisfies Frye.73
The district court, finding an anomaly in the Ramirez decision, stated
[w]e conclude that the issue before us, the admissibility of expert
testimony using comparison statistics to provide evidence regarding the
relevant force of a generally accepted scientific procedure, is encom-

68. 654 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
69. Id. at 184.
70. Id. at 185. These sample populations were taken from the field of human population
genetics. The statistical significance is measured by the frequency with which a particular
DNA pattern would be observed in a sample population.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Brim, 654 So. 2d at 188.
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passed in steps three and four of the analysis in Ramirez and does not
require application of the Frye test to those steps.7 4

In other words, the deductions can be admitted as long as the scientific
theory satisfies Frye. However, language in the Ramirez decision indicates
that deductions drawn from an accepted scientific theory must also satisfy
Frye.75 The Brim decision conflicts with Vargas v. State,76 in finding that
77
DNA population statistics do not need to meet the stringent Frye test.
The district court certified conflict between the two cases.78
B. Testimony by Experts
The Supreme Court of Florida settled a conflict among the district
courts regarding the use of expert testimony in the case of Angrand v.
Key. 79 Angrand arose out of a wrongful death suit. During the course of
the trial, the plaintiff introduced expert testimony on the issue of grief and
bereavement.8 0 The trial judge was reluctant to admit the testimony, since
the expert did not testify to anything that was outside the common
judge admitted the evidence
experience of the jury."1 However, the trial
82
Shelburne.
v.
Inc.
Inns,
Holiday
based on

74. Id
75. Ramirez, 651 So. 2d at 1168.
76. 640 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review granted,659 So. 2d 273 (Fla.
1995). The district court in Vargas found that the method used to arrive at probabilities was
not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.
77. Brim, 654 So. 2d at 187.
78. Id
79. 657 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1995).
80. Id at 1147.
81. Id

82. 576 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review dismissed, 589 So. 2d 291 (Fla.
1991). Shelburne allowed the testimony of an expert on grief and bereavement. Doctor
Platt, who testified in Angrand, was also the expert witness in Shelburne. In Shelburne, Dr.
Platt testified about grief and bereavement and how the plaintiffs, whose son had been killed,
worked their way through the grief process. The testimony included where the plaintiffs
were in the grief process at the time of trial, what factors had affected their response to their
son's death, and what grief they would experience in the future. The Fourth District Court
of Appeal upheld the trial courts ruling that the testimony was not outweighed by any
prejudicial effect, and that this testimony assisted the jurors in understanding an area that was
not within a person's normal everyday comprehension.
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The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the expert did
not testify to anything that was outside the common experience of the
jury. 3 The district court felt that most of the jurors had experienced the
death or loss of a loved one.84 Additionally, the district court found that
close family relationships and the loss of loved ones could be demonstrated
adequately with lay witness testimony.85 The district court concluded that
expert testimony on grief and bereavement was unduly prejudicial, since a
jury might give this testimony undue weight because it came from an expert
witness.86 In Angrand, the Third District Court of Appeal noted direct
conflict with the Shelburne case.87
The Supreme Court of Florida resolved the conflict between Angrand
and Shelburne by narrowing the Shelburne decision. The supreme court
found that a trial court is afforded broad discretion in determining the
subject matter on which an expert may testify.88 The Shelburne decision,
however, limited the trial court's discretion by making a general determination that the subject matter of that case, grief and bereavement, is not within
the juror's everyday understanding.89 The supreme court found that the
trial judge's discretion should not be so limited.9"
The trial court should exercise its discretion so that only expert
testimony which will assist the trier of fact will be admitted. Expert
testimony cannot be admitted to put otherwise inadmissible evidence before
the jury, to relay matters that are within the jurors common understanding,
or to summarize lay witness testimony.9 The supreme court concluded
that the trial judge in Angrand should have been able to exercise his
discretion to exclude Dr. Platt's testimony on grief, since it was not outside
the jury's common understanding. Binding the trial judge's discretion in
this area was error.92 Because Shelburne foreclosed the exercise of the trial
court's discretion regarding the admission of expert testimony, the supreme
court properly limited its scope.93

83. Key v. Angrand, 630 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 645 So.
2d 450 (Fla. 1994), rev'd, 657 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1995).
84. Id. at 650.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Town of Palm Beach v. Palm Beach County, 460 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1984).
89. Shelbourne, 576 So. 2d at 335-37.
90. Town of Palm Beach, 460 So. 2d at 885.
91. Angrand, 657 So. 2d at 1148.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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In a wrongful death action, the statute does not designate "grief' as a
recoverable damage. 94 However, the statute does allow for loss of
companionship and for mental pain and suffering. 95 The relevant testimony
on these subjects comes from lay witnesses who are generally friends and
survivors. These individuals testify as fact witnesses, not as experts. Since
there is no objective standard to measure this kind of damage, precise
calculations are hard to make. The jury is generally guided by its common
understanding and everyday life experiences in determining this type of
damage. Therefore, expert testimony in an area generally guided by
common life experiences may lead to an unfair assessment of damages. The
supreme court recognized this pitfall and reversed the Angrand case on the
issue of damages.9 6 However, the supreme court felt that the expert
was not so prejudicial as to require a reversal on the issue of
testimony
97
liability.
VI. HEARSAY
A. The Postell Rule
In Trotman v. State,9" the district court reversed the case for violation
of the Postell Rule.9 9 The defendant in Trotman was convicted for armed
robbery and armed burglary. At trial, the investigating officer testified that
after speaking to an unidentified, nontestifying juvenile, the officer went to
the location of the victim's stolen car and arrested the defendant."° The
district court realized that the only inference a jury could draw from this
testimony was that the juvenile told the officer that the defendant committed

94.

FLA. STAT.

§ 768.21 (1993 & Supp. 1994).

95. FLA. STAT. § 768.21(2) (1993).

96. Angrand, 657 So. 2d at 1151.
97. Id This makes perfect sense, since expert testimony on grief would probably not
be an integral part of the liability aspect of the case. However, this holding should be
confined to the facts of this case, since improperly admitted expert testimony, even on
damages issues, could be so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial on the issue of liability.
98. 652 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
99. Id. at 507. The Postell rule is in reality a violation of § 90.801(2) of the Florida
Statutes. It allows what is essentially hearsay evidence to come before the jury without
falling within a proper hearsay exception. Postell v. State, 398 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App.), review denied, 411 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1981). It occurs when testimony leads a jury to
believe that a non-testifying witness has given the police, or other witness, evidence of an
accused's guilt, even though the testimony of the non-testifying witness is hearsay and there
is no hearsay exception for it. Id
100. Trotman, 652 So. 2d at 507.
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the crime. 01 Since the juvenile was not subject to cross-examination as
required under section 90.801(2)(c), the statement of identification of the
defendant was improper."° Additionally, the statement did not fall under
another hearsay exception.
This situation almost inevitably arises when the prosecution has a gap
in their evidence. This gap is due, in part, to three possibilities: First, the
nontestifying witness may have simply disappeared; second, the
nontestifying witness may not have been identified by the investigating
officer in his police report, rendering the witness unknown; or third, the
attorney may have simply forgotten to subpoena the witness. In any case,
the prosecuting attorney must now try to fill the gap between the crime and
the defendant's arrest. This is done in an attempt to strengthen his or her
case, and lay it out in a logical manner. However, to avoid the hearsay
objection that occurs when the officer is questioned regarding what the
nontestifying witness told him, the prosecuting attorney usually resorts to
asking the officer what he did after he spoke with the witness.0 3 The
logical inference to be drawn from this is that the witness told the officer
that the defendant committed the crime.
Hearsay does not have to be verbal in order to be hearsay. When a
statement, belief, or assertion can be implied from the conduct or statement
of a person, the implied assertion is within the definition of hearsay."
Though the case does not add any new case law to this field, it is a good
reminder for attorneys that hearsay can take non-verbal as well as verbal
forms.
B. The Child Hearsay Exception
Section 90.803(23) of the FloridaStatutes creates a limited exception
to the hearsay rule for statements by children eleven years of age or
younger. The statement must describe an act of sexual abuse in the
presence of, with, by, or on the declarant child." 5 During the survey

101. Id.
102. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(c).
103. The prosecutor generally tells the officer not to repeat any statements of the
nontestifying witness. He is instructed to tell just what he did after he spoke with this
witness. The argument to the trial court is that since no statements were given, there can be
no hearsay violation.
104. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.7 (3d ed.
1991); EHRHARDT, supra note 6, § 801.2 at 552.
105. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (Supp. 1994).
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period, the Supreme Court of Florida settled a conflict between the district
courts of appeal regarding this statutory provision.
In State v. Dupree,1" the defendant was tried for the first-degree
murder of two-year-old Jirisha Thompson. Before the trial, the State gave
the requisite ten days notice pursuant to its intention to rely on section
90.803(23) for statements made by the six-year-old brother concerning the
crime. The defense objected on th6 grounds that the hearsay exception did
not apply to a declarant who was not the victim of the crime in question. 07
At trial, the six-year-old testified regarding what he had seen on the
night of the victim's death. Several adult witnesses testified to what the sixyear-old told the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS)
investigator during an interview regarding the events leading up to the
victim's death.10 8 The witnesses observed this interview through a twoway mirror with the help of an audio system. The defense objected to the
use of these hearsay statements made to the HRS investigator. 0 9
The defendant in Dupree was convicted at trial. On appeal, the First
District Court of Appeal reversed the conviction. The district court held that
the hearsay exception was not applicable to the child's statements because
the child was not the victim of the charged offense."'
In Russel v. State,"' the Fifth District Court of Appeal came to the
opposite conclusion, holding that "[s]tatements made by a child who
witnessed sexual battery and aggravated child abuse and who otherwise
meets the statutory criteria are not excepted from admissibility merely
because this child was not the object of the attack. '112 The Fifth District
reasoned3 that "[a] victim is a victim regardless of any charging document.",
The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the Dupree case and disapproved of the decision of the Russell court." 4 The Supreme Court of

106. 639 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 648 So. 2d 724 (Fla.
1994), aff'd, 656 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1995).
107. Dupree, 656 So. 2dat 431.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 572 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 583 So. 2d 1036
(Fla. 1991).
112. Id. at 942 (emphasis added).
113. Id.
114. Dupree, 656 So. 2d at 431.
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Florida followed prior rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States"'
and found that where statements do not fall within firmly rooted hearsay
exceptions, they are presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for Confrontation Clause purposes. 116 The Supreme Court of Florida declined to
expand child hearsay statements to statements made by children who were
not victims. Therefore, for hearsay statements of a child to be admissible
under section 90.803(23) of the Florida Statutes, "the prosecution of the
defendant must be based upon
the victimization of the child whose
'' 7
statements are being related."
VII. AUTHENTICATION
In Macht v. State,"8 the Fourth District Court of Appeal attempted
to clear up a misconception regarding the use of transcripts when a tape
recorded conversation has been admitted into evidence. In Macht, the
arresting officer testified that he pulled the defendant's car over.1 9 The
officer was tape recording the conversation with the defendant from the
moment he stopped the defendant's car.'20 At trial, the tape of the
conversation was admitted into evidence through the arresting officer who
made the tape.' 2' However, the defendant claimed that the trial court
committed reversible error by allowing the jury to view the transcript, which
was not properly authenticated, of the tape recording that had been entered
into evidence."
123
The district court stated that the rule announced in Stanley v. State,
prohibiting the use of transcripts of tapes when the tapes have been
introduced into evidence, has been superseded by the Supreme Court's of
Florida's ruling in Hill v. State. 24 Hill authorized a jury to view an
accurate transcript of an admitted tape recording as an aid in understanding

115. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818 (1990); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543
(1990).
116. Dupree, 656 So. 2d at 431.
117. Id. at 432.
118. 642 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
119. Id. at 1138.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. The Fourth District Court of Appeal recognized that many jurisdictions cite the
case of Stanley v. State, 451 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984), for the proposition
that trial courts should not allow the use of transcripts of tapes when the tapes have been
introduce into evidence. The district court attempted to clear up this misconception.
123. 451 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
124. 549 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1989).
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the tape so long as the unadmitted transcript does not go back to the jury
room or become a focal point of the trial."z
During trial, the defendant in Macht objected that the transcript of the
tape was not properly authenticated because the individual who prepared the
transcript did not testify. 126 However, the arresting officer who made the
tape recording testified at trial that the transcript was accurate.'2 7 Since
the arresting officer testified that the transcripts were an accurate reproduction of the tape recordings, no further authentication or proof was needed." Additionally, the trial court clearly instructed the jury that if there
were any discrepancies between the tape and the transcript, the jury should
rely on the tape, since it was the tape that was in evidence.'2 9 Hopefully,
the district court's opinion will help clarify any further problems with the
use of transcripts at trial when a tape recording has been admitted.
VIII. ADDITIONS AND AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA EVIDENCE
CODE
During the survey period, the Florida Legislature made various
additions and amendments to the FloridaEvidence Code. The new Code
sections bear directly on the admissibility of evidence at trial.
A. Gender-NeutralLanguage
The Florida Evidence Code was rewritten in gender-neutral language. 3 ' When possible, the Code employed the use of plural instead of
singular pronouns to avoid both gender-specific language and awkwardness.
Changes made for gender-neutral purposes were made throughout the Code,
and are not detailed in this article. No substantive changes were intended
by these amendments.

125. Id. at 182.
126. Macht, 642 So. 2d at 1138.

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1138-39. The trial transcripts did not go back to the jury room and did not
become a focal point of the trial. Therefore, the use of the transcripts as an aid in
understanding the tape was proper. Hill, 549 So. 2d at 182.
130. See, e.g., Ch. 95-147, § 471, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 171, 538 (West) (amending
FLA. STAT. §90.105 (1993)).
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B. Domestic Violence Advocate-Victim Privilege
A new privilege was also added to the Florida Evidence Code.'3'
Section 90.5036 now allows communications between a domestic violence

131. Ch. 95-187, § 7, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1368, 1371-72 (West) (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 90.5036). The section reads as follows:
90.5036. Domestic violence advocate-victim privilege
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) A "domestic violence center" is any public or private agency that
offers assistance to victims of domestic violence, as defined in s. 741.28, and
their families.
(b) A "domestic violence advocate" means any employee or volunteer
who has 30 hours of training in assisting victims of domestic violence and is an
employee of or volunteer for a program for victims of domestic violence whose
primary purpose is the rendering of advice, counseling, or assistance to victims
of domestic violence.
(c) A "victim" is a person who consults a domestic violence advocate for
the purpose of securing advice, counseling, or assistance concerning a mental,
physical or emotional condition cause by an act of domestic violence, an alleged
act of domestic violence, or an attempted act of domestic violence.
(d) A communication between a domestic violence advocate and a victim
is "confidential" if it relates to the incident of domestic violence for which the
victim is seeking assistance and if it is not intended to be disclosed to third
persons other than:
1. Those persons present to further the interest of the victim in the
consultation, assessment, or interview.
2. Those persons to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary to
accomplish the purpose for which the domestic violence advocate is consulted.
(2) A victim has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other
person from disclosing, a confidential communication made by the victim to a
domestic violence advocate or any record made in the course of advising,
counseling, or assisting the victim. The privilege applies to confidential
communications made between the victim and the domestic violence advocate
and to records of those communications only if the advocate is registered under
s. 415.605 at the time the communication is made. This privilege includes any
advice given by the domestic violence advocate in the course of that relationship.
(3) The privilege may be claimed by:
(a) The victim or the victim's attorney on behalf of the victim.
(b) A guardian or conservator of the victim.
(c) The personal representative of a deceased victim.
(d) The domestic violence advocate, but only on behalf of the victim.
The authority of a domestic violence advocate to claim the privilege is presumed
in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
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187

worker and a victim to be privileged.' 32 The new section provides for
those persons to whom the communication can be disclosed without waiving
the privilege.'33 The new section also has a provision 3regarding
the
4
confidentiality of records and who may claim the privilege.
C.

Mode and Order of Interrogationand Presentation

During the survey period, the Florida Legislature altered subsection
three of section 90.612 of the FloridaStatutes, which deals with the use of
leading questions.135 The section appears to merely codify parts of rule
1.450(a) of the FloridaRules of Civil Procedure,dealing with evidence and
the interrogation of witnesses. 36 Subsection three reiterates the use of
direct-examination questions on direct and leading questions on crossexamination, with some caveats. The amendment to subsection three allows
leading questions on direct-examination when attempting to develop a

132. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 90.5036(1)(d)).
133. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 90.5036(1)(d)(1), (2)).
134. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 90.5036(2), (3)).
135. Ch. 95-179, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1307, 1308 (West) (amending FLA.
STAT. § 90.612(3) (1993)). The section was amended to read as follows:
90.612. Mode and order of interrogation and presentation.
(3) Leading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a
witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness' testimony.
Ordinarily, leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When
a party calls a hostile witness, and adverse party, or a witness identified with an
adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions. Exeept as pr'ed
by, rale f eeurt or 'hen the inter sto of ju tiee ether.wise reqe'rc.
pat
ma no

kmi t

ter-Fee-s

skawtns

fafigqetiea an diroot er redireet

party may ask a witness a leading Eluestien ont eress examinatien
:xaminatien.

Id.
136. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.450(a). This section reads as follows:
Rule 1.450 EVIDENCE
(a) Adverse Witness. A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile
witness by leading questions. A party may call an adverse party or an officer,
director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership
or association which is an adverse party and interrogate that person by leading
questions and contradict and impeach that person in all respects as if that person
had been called by the adverse party, and the witness thus called may be
contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also and may
be cross-examined by the adverse party only upon the subject matter of that
witness' examination in chief.
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witness' testimony, when the witness is hostile, an adverse party, when the
witness is identified with an adverse party, or when the interests of justice
otherwise require it.' 37

D. Hearsay Exception: Statement of Elderly Person or Disabled
Adult
During the survey period a new hearsay exception was added to the
Florida Evidence Code.'38 Section 90.803(24) now allows the statement

137. Ch. 95-179, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1308 (West) (amending FLA. STAT.
§ 90.612(3) (1993)).
138. Ch. 95-158, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1263, 1263-64 (West) (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)). The section reads as follows:
90.803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.
The provision of § 90.802 to the contrary notwithstanding, the following
are not inadmissible as evidence, even though the declarant is available as a
witness:
(24) HEARSAY EXCEPTION; STATEMENT OF ELDERLY PERSON
OR DISABLED ADULT.
(a) Unless the source of information or the method or circumstances by
which the statement is reported indicates a lack of trustworthiness, an out-ofcourt statement made by an elderly person or disabled adult, as defined in s.
825.101, describing any act of abuse or neglect, any act of exploitation, the
offense of battery or aggravated battery or assault or aggravated assault or
sexual battery, or any other violent act on the declarant elderly person or
disabled adult, not otherwise admissible, is admissible in evidence in any civil
or criminal proceeding if:
1. The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury
that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient
safeguards of reliability. In making its determination the court may consider the
mental and physical age and maturity of the elderly person or disabled adult, the
nature and duration of the abuse or offense, the relationship of the victim to the
offender, the reliability of the assertion, the reliability of the elderly person or
disabled adult, and any other factor deemed appropriate; and
2. The elderly person or disabled adult either:
a. Testifies; or
b. Is unavailable as a witness, provided that there is corroborative
evidence of the abuse or offense. Unavailability shall include a finding by the
court that the elderly person's or disabled adult's participation in the trial or
proceeding would result in a substantial likelihood of severe emotional, mental,
or physical harm in addition to findings pursuant to s. 90.804(1).
(b) In a criminal action, the defendant shall be notified no later than 10
days before the trial that a statement which qualifies as a hearsay exception
pursuant to this subsection will be offered as evidence at trial. The notice shall
include a written statement of the content of the elderly person's or disabled
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of an elderly or disabled person describing any act of abuse, neglect,
exploitation, battery, aggravated battery, assault, aggravated assault, sexual
battery, or any other violent act on the declarant into evidence in any civil
or criminal proceeding. 139 The statements are admissible if certain
prerequisites are met.
For this hearsay testimony to be admissible, the trial court must hold
a hearing regarding the time, content, and circumstances of the statement to
ensure its reliability."' The factors the court is to consider in this determination are the mental and physical age of the elderly or disabled adult, the
nature and duration of the abuse or offense, the relationship of the victim to
the offender, the reliability of the assertion of the elderly or disabled adult,
and any other appropriate factor. 41
In addition to the trial court's initial findings, the elderly or disabled
Unavailability includes a
person must either testify or be unavailable."
finding that the trial or proceeding would result in severe emotional, mental
or physical harm, in addition to findings of unavailability which the court
must make under section 90.804(1).'43
In criminal proceedings, a notice provision has been added before any
hearsay statement falling under section 90.803(24) can be used.1" Since
any mention of civil actions was excluded from this notice provision section,
it naturally follows that the ten-day notice provision is not applicable to civil

adult's statement, the time at which the statement was made, the circumstances
surrounding the statement which indicate its reliability, and such other
particulars as necessary to provide full disclosure of the statement.
(c)The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, as to the
basis for its rulings under this subsection.
Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(a)(1)).
141. Id.
142. Ch. 95-158, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1263 (West) (to be codified at FLA.
STAT. § 90.803(24)(a)(2)(a), (b)). The prerequisite of § 90.803(24)(a), regarding unavailability, will cause confusion with its inclusion in this section of hearsay since § 90.803 exceptions
do not require the declarant to be unavailable. The availability of the declarant is immaterial
to use of hearsay under § 90.803. Unavailability as a factor before the hearsay statement can
be used is more appropriately utilized in § 90.804. Perhaps the better procedure would have
been to split the new hearsay exception into two separate sections in the evidence code, one
in § 90.803 and one in § 90.804, to avoid confusion and keep the evidence code in proper
form. Availability immaterial under § 90.803; Declarant unavailable under § 90.804. It
appears that this simple solution was not considered.
143. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(a)(2)(b)).
144. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(b)).
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actions.' 45 However, the trial judge must make specific findings of fact
is utilized. This requirement
on the record whenever section 90.803(24)
46
applies to both criminal and civil actions.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida's resolution of conflicts between
jurisdictions on expert evidence and child hearsay will help trial judges and
attorneys better prepare their cases. However, the supreme court's
occasional blatant disregard in overturning a lower court's decision when the
error has neither been preserved nor found to be fundamental, continues to
be an area of some consternation. The legislature's addition of yet another
hearsay exception and evidentiary privilege is sure to generate additional
case law in the coming year, and keep our appellate courts busy.

145. Id.
146. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(c)).
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